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IV

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Joby Lee Hanner appeals from his conviction for leaving the scene of an
injury accident.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
At about 9:00 p.m. on April 7, 2010, Brenda Fullerton parked her Dodge
truck on the street in front of a post office in Ririe, and went into the post office to
pick up her mail. (Tr., p.3, L.24 - p.4, L.4; p.19, Ls.1-2; p.29, L.21 - p.31, L.13.)
Ms. Fullerton checked her post office box, and as she walked back to her truck,
she heard the squealing and burning of tires, which scared her. (Tr., p.31, L.23 p.32, L.4.) Ms. Fullerton walked to the door of her truck, and when she looked
up, she saw Hanner's truck coming at her, and instead of opening her door, she
turned to run. (Tr., p.32, Ls.10-21.) However, after Ms. Fullerton took two steps,
the backend of Hanner's truck hit her, and smashed her into her own truck,
causing her to flip up in the air and down onto the ground. (Id.) Hanner left the
area with the tires of his truck still burning as Ms. Fullerton lay on the ground.
(Id.)
Ms. Fullerton was taken by ambulance to a hospital, where it was
determined she had suffered two broken ribs, four broken bones in her lower
back, and massive soft tissue bruising to her legs, back, stomach and
"everywhere." (Tr., p.34, Ls. 6-16.) She was initially released from the hospital
after three days, but two weeks later, she had to be re-hospitalized due to a
pulmonary embolism in her lungs. (Tr., p.34, Ls.16-23.) Ms. Fullerton remained
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in the hospital seven more days, including five days in intensive care, and, as
she testified, "twice they thought they were going to lose me." (Tr., p.34, L.17 p.35, L.3.)
Justin Mangis was at the Maverik store across the street from the post
office that same evening, and saw Hanner walk out of the store, yelling at "his
girlfriend or somebody that he was with, [get] into his [60's black Ford] pickup
and started squealing his tires right at the gas pump and headed out onto the
road and when he was headed out lost kind of control and hit the lady, Brenda
Fullerton." (Tr., p.4, Ls.10-15; p.6, Ls.21-23.) Mr. Mangis explained that when
Hanner's pickup spun out of control, the back end of the truck hit Ms. Fullerton as
she turned to run away from her own truck, which she had been starting to enter.
(Tr., p.8, L.23 - p.9, L.B.)
After his truck hit and seriously injured Ms. Fullerton, Hanner continued to
drive away.

(Tr., p.9, L.23 - p.10, L.5.)

Mr. Mangis ran to Ms. Fullerton's

assistance and stayed with her until emergency medical personnel arrived. (Tr.,
p.5, L.15 - p.6, L.11.) Mr. Mangis noticed that Ms. Fullerton's truck sustained a
dent from where her body had been pushed into it, a dent which appears to have
been subsequently noted by Deputy Sheriff Williams in his investigation of the
crime scene. (Tr., p.13, Ls.10-24; p.45, L.25 - p.46, L.5.)
Brandy Hayes was working as a cashier at the Maverik store when
Hanner struck Ms. Fullerton with his truck, and noticed that, while in the store,
Hanner and the woman he was with "acted as though they were upset with each
other." (Tr., p.18, L.25 - p.20, L.6; p.23, L.20 - p.24, L.2.) When Hanner and the
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woman got into Hanner's truck, "the tires just spun, like laid rubber on the
pavement and he spun out around the gas pump" and "fishtailed out of the
parking lot and then out on the road," causing Ms. Hayes to fear the truck would
tip over.

(Tr., p.20, Ls.18-24.)

Ms. Hayes said she saw "the rear end of the

pickup [as it] swung back around toward the Post Office, [and] there was a
pickup truck parked in front of it, a white Dodge truck, and [she] saw it rock back
and forth like it had been hit and customers from the parking lot had ran over in
front of the Post Office and a woman had come back and said call 911." (Tr.,
p.20, L.24 - p.21, L.7.) Ms. Hayes noticed, and wrote down, the license plate
number o-f Hanner's truck as it came around the corner. (Tr., p.22, Ls.10-13.)
After the license plate number of the out-of-control truck was provided to
law enforcement, it was determined the truck was registered to Hanner, an arrest
warrant was issued for his arrest and, nine days after the incident, he was
voluntarily taken into custody. (Tr., p.42, Ls.6-16; p.50, Ls.4-8; p.61, L.22 - p.62,
L.8.)

The state charged Hanner with leaving the scene of an injury accident

under I.C. § 18-8007. (R., pp.27-29.) After a jury trial, Hanner was convicted of
that crime. (R., p.148.) The district court imposed a sentence of five years with
four years determinate. (R., pp.163-165.) Hanner timely appealed. (R., pp.168170.)
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ISSUES
Hanner states the issues on appeal as follows:
I.

There was insufficient evidence to support the Jury's Verdict.

II.

The Court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included
offense of reckless driving.

111.

The Defendant's right to a fair trial was prejudiced by the State's
Failure to preserve evidence.

IV.

The sentence imposed by the Court was excessive[.]

(Appellant's Brief, p.4 (capitalization original).)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Is there substantial evidence in the record to support the jury's verdict
finding Hanner guilty of leaving the scene of an injury accident?

2.
Has Hanner failed to show any error in the district court's refusal to
instruct the jury on reckless driving as a lesser included offense?
3.
Is Hanner precluded from appellate review of his claim that his right to a
fair trial was violated by the state's failure to preserve evidence because he failed
to object below and has failed to argue, much less establish, fundamental error?
4.
Has Hanner failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion?
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ARGUMENT

I.
There Is Substantial Evidence In The Record To Support
The Jury's Verdict Finding Hanner Guilty Of Leaving The Scene Of An Injury
Accident
A.

Introduction
Hanner argues on appeal that the jury's verdict finding him guilty of

leaving the scene of an injury accident was not supported by adequate evidence.
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.) Hanner specifically claims the evidence failed to prove
he knew or had reason to know that his vehicle hit and injured the victim, Brenda
Fullerton. 1 (Id.) Hanner's argument is without merit. Hanner's claim that he did
not actually know his truck struck and injured Ms. Fullerton does not negate the
substantial evidence that was presented to the jury showing he either knew or
reasonably should have known his vehicle hit and injured her.

B.

Standard Of Review
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon

a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 285-86, 77 P.3d 956, 974-75 (2003);
State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992). The appellate
court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the credibility of the
witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable
1

Hanner does not contest that Ms. Fullerton was injured by his truck, or that he
left the scene of the injury accident; he only contests knowing, or having reason
to know, Ms. Fullerton was injured when he left the scene. (See Appellant's
Brief, p.5.)
5

inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 68384, 99 P.3d 1069, 1073-74 (2004) (plurality); State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101,
104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. App. 1991 ); State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683, 684,
701 P.2d 303, 304 (Ct. App. 1985).
In determining if the evidence is substantial and competent, it will be
considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution.

State v. Miller, 131

Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 {Ct. App. 1997); Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104,
822 P.2d at 1001. Substantial evidence is present when a "reasonable mind"
could conclude that guilt was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Hoyle, 140
Idaho at 683-84, 99 P .3d at 1073-74.

C.

Substantial Evidence Supports The Jury's Verdict That Hanner Knew Or
Had Reason To Know He Hit And Injured The Victim With His Vehicle
Hanner contends "[t]here is no doubt from the record that he saw [Ms.

Fullerton], but there is certainly a reasonable doubt as to whether he knew or
reasonably should have known that he actually struck her." (Appellant's Brief,
p.5.)

An "appellate court's function is not to weigh and consider the

contradictions and inconsistencies which appellant finds in the testimony, but
rather to determine whether there is substantial evidence in support of the verdict
of the jury, taking the view of the evidence most favorable to the sustained party."
State v. Gissel, 105 Idaho 287, 292, 668 P.2d 1018, 1023 (Ct. App. 1983).
According to I.C. § 18-8007, "[t]he driver of any vehicle that has been involved in
an accident

. . . who knows or has reason to know that said accident has

resulted in injury to or death of any person" is required to remain at the scene of
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that accident and perform certain statutorily defined duties.

Therefore, even if

there is no evidence directly showing that Hanner actually knew his vehicle
struck and injured the victim, that fact alone is not a basis for setting aside the
jury's verdict.

The relevant inquiry is limited to whether there is substantial

evidence in the record supporting the jury's verdict that Hanner knew or had
reason to know his vehicle had done so. I.C. § 18-8007. Here, the record is rife

with substantial evidence that Hanner knew or had reason to know that he was
involved in an accident in which the victim was struck and injured by his vehicle,
and he left the scene of the accident.
Ms. Fullerton gave the following account of the accident that occurred
after she parked her truck on a street and went into a post office:
I went in to get my mail and I got my mail and I came out and
I heard this squealing of tires, and to me, I thought to myself there
must be a 16-year-old kid that just got his dad's truck for the night
and doesn't have to pay for these tires because he was just burning
them as hard as he could and it scared me. I was like, wow, I'm
getting out of here before that idiot gets on the road. And as fast as
he was going, I thought there was no way he could come my
direction and he would have been going the other way ... so I was
just hurrying to get into my truck.
And I walked around the front of my truck and I got to my
door and something said don't open that door, and I looked up and
he's coming right at me and at first I [sic] was slow motion and it
happened so fast and his headlights were right in my eyes, and I
mean I was like, wow, and I didn't open my door, I turned to run
and I took two steps and the back end of his truck struck me and
just smashed me up against my truck, slid me across the front and
flipped me up in the air and down on the ground and he's still
burning his tires, just left and left me there laying on the ground.
(Tr., p.31, L.23 - p.32, L.21.)
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Ms. Fullerton reiterated that the headlights from Hanner's truck were
"directly in her eyes," and testified, "[i]f he didn't see me, he had his eyes shut. I
couldn't see for [sic] light, that's how close he was to me." (Tr., p.35, Ls.13-16.)
When asked by the prosecutor, "[i]n your mind, is there any question that he
knew he hit you?," Ms. Fullerton answered "[n]one."

(Tr., p.36, Ls.14-15.)

Hanner's trial counsel asked Ms. Fullerton to explain why she believed Hanner
"knew he hit you" (Tr., p.36, Ls.24-25), and she responded:
Because anytime I'm driving anything in my lights, even a
mouse that runs across the road, you can see it. You can't tell me
that I seen four headlights in my eyes and he didn't see me. I find
that so hard to believe.
(Tr., p.37, Ls.1-5.)
Ms. Fullerton's testimony that the four headlights of Hanner's truck were
directly in her eyes just before it hit her gave the jury substantial evidence that
Hanner knew, or, had reason to know, his truck had struck and injured her before
he left the accident scene.
In addition, Justin Mangis testified that he saw Hanner's truck spin out and
its back end hit Ms. Fullerton "as she was walking around as [sic] she was
starting to get into her vehicle it looked like because she turned to run and that's
when it hit the back of the vehicle .... " (Tr., p.8, L.23 - p.9, L.8.) Mr. Mangis
noticed Ms. Fullerton's truck appeared to have been dented from where her body
had been pushed into it when Hanner's truck hit her. (Tr., p.13, L.10- p.14, L.6.)
Deputy Sheriff Williams confirmed that he also saw a dent on the side of Ms.
Fullerton's truck, which he measured from to get the distance Ms. Fullerton had
been thrown from her truck. (Tr., p.13, Ls.10-24; p.45, L.25 - p.46, L.5.)
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Another eyewitness, Brandy Hayes, testified that after Hanner's truck
fishtailed out of the parking lot:
I thought for sure he was going to roll over, and then when the rear
end of the pickup swung back around toward the Post Office, there
was a pickup truck parked in front of it, a white Dodge truck, and I
saw it rock back and forth like it had been hit and customers from
the parking lot had ran over in front of the Post Office and a woman
had come back and said call 911.
(Tr., p.20, L24 - p.21, L.7 (emphasis added).) The effect that Hanner's truck
had in causing Ms. Fullerton's truck to be dented and to rock back and forth like it
had been hit, as testified to by Justin Mangis and Brandy Hayes, was strong
evidence Hanner had to have known (or should have known) that his truck
directly impacted Ms. Fullerton's truck, or worse, struck Ms. Fullerton as she was
sandwiched between the two trucks.
Moreover, about a week after the accident, Deputy Sheriff Williams
interviewed Hanner, who explained that on the night of the accident he and his
girlfriend had been in an argument while at the Maverik store, he squealed his
tires going out of the Maverik parking lot, he lost control of his truck, he saw Ms.
Fullerton standing by her truck, and he saw Ms. Fullerton running.

(Tr., p.51,

Ls.6-25.)
In sum, there was substantial evidence to support the jury's finding that
Hanner either knew or had reason to know his truck struck and injured Ms.
Fullerton.

Although Hanner did not admit he actually knew his truck hit and

injured Ms. Fullerton, the testimony presented at trial provided substantial
evidence whereby a jury could have reasonably concluded he knew it had. The
testimony all the more clearly established, alternatively, that, whether he had
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actual knowledge or not, Hanner had reason to know Ms. Fullerton was hit and
injured by his truck. Consequently, there is no basis for Hanner's contention that
there was insufficient evidence to convict him. 2

IL
Hanner Has Failed To Show Any Error In The District Court's Refusal To Instruct
The Jury On Reckless Driving As A Lesser Included Offense
Hanner claims the district court "erred by failing to instruct the jury and
give them the opportunity to deliberate regarding a lesser included offense of
Reckless Driving." (Appellant's Brief, p.6 (capitalization original).) This claim is
without merit.
"An offense will be deemed to be a lesser included offense of another,
greater offense, if all the elements required to sustain a conviction of the lesser
2

In the last paragraph of Hanner's brief of his "insufficient evidence" issue, he
adds two entirely new issues, stating:
In addition, it was prejudicial to the Defendant and created
confusion to the jury for the investigating Officer Aaron Williams to
be asked if the Defendant's statement regarding knowledge of
hitting the victim was contradicted by his girlfriend and then be cutoff by the Court regarding any further direct or cross-examination.
(Tr., Pg.47[.]) As indicated the Appellant asserts as part of this
issue that his right to a fair trial was denied by not being allowed to
mention his girlfriend Jessica Simmons or call her as a witness.
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.) Contrary to Hanner's claim, the record does not show the
trial court cut his attorney off "regarding any further direct or cross-examination."
(See Tr., p.47, L.5 - p.48, L.3.) Instead, the court appears to have merely
precluded the prosecutor from presenting obvious hearsay testimony through
Officer Williams about what Hanner's girlfriend said.
(Id. (off the record
discussion after the prosecutor asked the officer if Hanner's denial that he knew
he had hit Ms. Fullerton "contradict[ed] the statements of his girlfriend").)
Moreover, the record does not reflect that the trial court denied Hanner the
opportunity to call his girlfriend as a witness, or mention her. (See generally Tr.,
p.92, L. 18 - p.105, L.21.) Given the lack of any evidentiary basis for Hanner's
additional arguments, no further response by the state is warranted.
10

included offense are included within the elements of the greater offense," or "if in
committing an offense one necessarily commits a second offense."

State v.

Cariaga, 95 Idaho 900, 902, 523 P.2d 32, 34 (1974) (citations omitted). As the
Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized, "(t)here are two theories by which an
offense may be deemed a lesser included offense - statutory theory and
pleading theory." State v. Cochran, 149 Idaho 688, 690, 239 P.3d 793, 795 (Ct.
App. 2010).

More recently, in State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 261 P.3d 519

(2011), the Idaho Supreme Court applied both the statutory and pleading
theories to determine whether sexual abuse is a lesser included offense of lewd
conduct, expressing no preference for one test versus the other, and providing
no indication that one test applies to state constitutional claims while the other
applies to federal constitutional claims.
"Under the statutory theory, a crime may be a lesser included offense if its
elements are necessarily included in the greater crime, as the greater crime is
defined by statute." Cochran, 149 Idaho at 690, 239 P.3d at 795. See also State
v. Curtis, 130 Idaho 522, 524, 944 P.2d 119, 121 (1997) ("For an offense to be
an included offense of a charged offense under the statutory theory, it must be
impossible to commit the greater offense without having committed the lesser
offense.").

The offense of leaving the scene of an injury accident can be

committed without the driver of the vehicle involved in an accident having driven
recklessly. Idaho Code § 18-8007 requires that "[t]he driver of any vehicle that
has been involved in an accident . . . who knows or has reason to know that
said accident has resulted in injury to or death of any person" stop at the scene
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of the accident and remain until the driver has fulfilled all the requirements listed
under the statutory provisions.

I.C. § 18-8007(1 )(a)-(e).

Because there is no

element of reckless (or even negligent) driving that must be proven in order to
commit the crime of leaving the scene of an injury accident, reckless driving is
not a lesser included offense to that crime under the statutory theory.
Under the pleading theory, an offense is an included offense if the state
has pied the elements of the lesser included offense as the means whereby the
defendant committed the greater offense. Curtis, 130 Idaho at 524, 944 P.2d at
121. The Information in Hanner's case alleged that Hanner "was the driver of a
vehicle involved in an accident at 11 0 West Ririe Highway, and willfully failed to
stop, remain, give information, and render aid, knowing or having reason to know
that a person was injured as a result of the accident."

(R., p.27.)

The

Information made no mention of any culpable driving, much less reckless driving;
therefore, under the pleading theory, the district court properly refused to instruct
the jury that reckless driving was a lesser included offense to the crime of leaving
the scene of an injury accident.
Under either the statutory or pleading theory, Hanner has failed to show
the district court erred in denying his request to instruct the jury that reckless
driving is a lesser included offense to the crime of leaving the scene of an injury
accident.
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111.
Hanner Is Not Entitled To Appellate Review Of His Claim That His Riqht To A
Fair Trial Was Violated By The State's Failure To Preserve Evidence Because
He Failed To Object Below And Has Failed To Argue, Much Less Establish,
Fundamental Error
A.

Introduction
For the first time on appeal, Hanner argues that his due process right to a

fair trial was violated because the state recorded over the tape recording of his
interview by Officer Williams. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-8.) This Court must decline
to consider the merits of Hanner's due process claim because he did not assert it
below and, therefore, failed to preserve the issue for appeal. Even if reviewed,
Hanner has failed to demonstrate any due process violation, much less one
amounting to fundamental error.

B.

Standard Of Review
On appeal of a claimed due process violation, the appellate court will defer

to the factual findings of the trial court if supported by substantial evidence. State
v. Avelar, 124 Idaho 317,322,859 P.2d 353,358 (Ct App. 1993).

C.

Hanner Has Failed To Preserve His Due Process Claim For Appeal
"Generally ldaho 1s appellate courts will not consider error not preserved

for appeal through an objection at trial." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, _ , 245
P.3d 961, 976 (2010) (citing State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 892, 896, 894 P.2d
125, 129 (1995)). Nor will Idaho's appellate courts "review a trial court's alleged
error on appeal unless the record discloses an adverse ruling which forms the
basis for the assignment of error." State v. Fisher, 123 Idaho 481, 485, 849 P.2d
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942, 946 (1993); see also State v. Olson, 138 Idaho 438, 442, 64 P.3d 967, 971
(Ct. App. 2003) (citing State v. Barnett, 133 Idaho 231,235,985 P.2d 111,115
(1999)). In this case, Hanner waived appellate consideration of his due process
claim by failing to make any objection or file an appropriate motion upon learning
that the tape recording of his interview with Officer Williams no longer existed
because it was recorded over with other matters. (See generally Tr., p.79, L.14 p.81, L.9; see also Appellant's Brief, pp.7-8.)

Because the issue was neither

presented to, nor decided by the trial court, this Court must decline to consider
the merits of Hanner's due process claim.

D.

Hanner Has Failed To Demonstrate That The Recording-Over Of The
Interview Tape Constitutes Fundamental Error
An exception to the principle that an objection to a constitutional violation

must be made in the trial court exists if the alleged error is fundamental. Perry,
150 Idaho at_, 245 P.3d at 976. The burden of demonstrating fundamental
error rests squarely with the defendant asserting the error for the first time on
appeal. lQ.,_ at_, 245 P.3d at 980; State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 717, 215
P.3d 414, 437 (2009). To carry that burden, a defendant claiming error for the
first time on appeal must demonstrate that the error he alleges "(1) violates one
or more of [his] unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need
for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3)
was not harmless." Perry, 150 Idaho at

, 245 P.3d at 980. However, Hanner

has not presented any argument on appeal that the recording-over of his taped
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interview constitutes fundamental error under the standards articulated in Perry.
(See Appellant's Brief, pp.7-8.)

Even if Hanner had presented a fundamental

error argument in this appeal, it would not have merit.
Hanner cannot show a violation of one or more of his unwaived
constitutional rights.

Perry, 150 Idaho at _ , 245 P.3d at 980.

It is well-

established that the state does not violate a defendant's due process rights if it
loses or destroys evidence that is only potentially useful to the defense unless
that destruction is shown to be in bad faith. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51,
58 (1988); State v. Bennett, 142 Idaho 166, 170-71, 125 P.3d 522, 526-27
(2005). Hanner claims that the "police reports summarizing [his] interview were
contradictory to what [he] asserts was actually said during the course of his
discussion with Officer Williams and would have been reflected on the tape
recording." (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) The only discernable conflict between the
testimony of Hanner and Officer Williams reflected in the record is that the officer
stated that Hanner admitted during his interview that he saw Ms. Fullerton
running, which Hanner denied having said.

(Tr., p.51, Ls.21-25; p.99, L.21 -

p.100, L.2.) Given that conflicting testimony, the lost or destroyed tape recording
is only potentially useful to Hanner because it cannot be said with absolute
certainty what it would have shown. Therefore, Hanner is required to show bad
faith on the part of law enforcement in allowing the tape recording of his interview
to be recorded over. However, there is no indication in the record that officers
acted in bad faith by allowing the taped interview to be recorded over, and
Hanner has pointed to none.

To the contrary, the explanation as to how
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Hanner's interview was taped over indicates it was done accidentally.

The

prosecutor told the trial court:
What happened, according to the officer, when he went into the
interview room he thought that they actually recorded - turned on.
What happened is it was continuous and it got recorded over, so
there is no such recorded document that we could provide. The
only thing that we have which we've provided is the officer's report
in regards to the interview. There is no such recording.
(Tr., p.80, Ls.12-19.)
Even if the officers acted negligently in maintaining the tape recording of
Hanner's interview, such negligence does not rise to the level of bad faith.
Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58 (destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence due
to negligence, not bad faith); State v. Dopp, 129 Idaho 597, 607, 930 P.2d 1039,
1049 (Ct. App. 1996).

Hanner has failed to show any bad faith by law

enforcement, and in turn, any due process violation by the recording-over of his
taped interview.

Therefore, he has failed to meet the first requirement for

showing fundamental error under Perry, that one of his constitutional rights was
violated.

Because Hanner cannot demonstrate a violation of a constitutional

right, he necessarily cannot meet the second and third requirements for
fundamental error -- that the constitutional error plainly exists and that the error
was not harmless. 3

Perry, 150 Idaho at

3

245 P.3d at 980.

Hanner has

The trial court did not determine whether the testimony of Officer Williams or
Hanner was more credible as to whether Hanner said during his interview that he
had seen Ms. Fullerton running, and no evidence that law enforcement recorded
over the tape of the interview in bad faith was presented. Therefore, Hanner has
failed to meet the second requirement for showing fundamental error under
Perry, that the constitutional violation must be "plain," or "clear" from the record.
Perry, 150 Idaho at_, 245 P.3d at 977. Hanner should not be excused from
having to meet that burden. Further, the only disputed statement from Hanner's
16

therefore failed to demonstrate fundamental error by the state's apparent
inadvertent recording-over of his taped interview with Officer Williams.

IV.
Hanner Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
A.

Introduction
The district court imposed a sentence of five years with four years

determinate. (R., pp.163-165.) Hanner argues this sentence was an abuse of
the district court's discretion, contending he should have been permitted to enter
the Wood Pilot Project, a specialty court program, 4 he intended no harm to Ms.
Fullerton, he had taken responsibility for his crime by turning himself in to law
enforcement after he learned Ms. Fullerton had been injured, and he expressed
extreme remorse for her injuries. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-10.) Hanner has failed
to show that the district court's view of the case was unreasonable.

interview is whether, after telling the officer he saw Ms. Fullerton by the front of
her truck (as he struggled to straighten his truck out; see Tr., p.99, L.18 - p.100,
L.3), Hanner also said he saw her running. Hanner cannot meet the third Perry
factor by showing this alleged error was not harmless, i.e., that it "must have
affected the outcome of the trial proceedings." kl Even if Hanner's testimony
that he told the officer he saw Ms. Fullerton by the front of her truck - not running
- as he struggled to control his truck had not been contradicted, such a slight
difference in testimony could not possibly have made a difference in the jury's
determination that Hanner knew, or had reason to know, his truck hit and injured
Ms. Fullerton.
4

According to Hanner's trial counsel, the 'Wood Court Pilot Project ... starts out
with individuals in custody, then after [inmates have] shown progress in custody
are [sic] moved into the work release program." (Tr., p.124, Ls.6-10.) It is
unclear from the appellate record how that program differs from an inmate being
allowed to, as the district court phrased it, "participate in the work center," which
the court did not "object" to, assuming Hanner qualified for such participation.
(Tr., p.144, Ls.11-14.)
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B.

Standard Of Review
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review

only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farvvell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d
397, 401 (2007).

C.

Hanner Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its
Sentencing Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant

must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was
excessive. State v. Farvvell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). To
establish that the sentence was excessive, he must demonstrate that reasonable
minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the
sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.
Farvvell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. In determining whether the appellant
met his burden, the court considers the entire sentence but, because the
decision to release him on parole is exclusively the province of the executive
branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be the period of actual
incarceration. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).
The district court noted that Hanner did seem to show sincere remorse for
the injuries sustained by Ms. Fullerton, that he was a skilled worker with a
supportive family, and he had alcohol and mental health issues. (Tr., p.137, L.7
- p.142, L.22.) The court stated that it was very familiar with the "Wood Pilot
Program/ and explained that space in that program was limited.
Ls.16-17.)

(Tr., p.137,

Nevertheless, after considering Hanner's criminal record, the four
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sentencing factors under State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707 (Ct. App.
1982), and the criteria under I.C. § 19-2521 for determining whether prison or
probation is appropriate, the district court was well within its discretion in
concluding that a unified sentence of five years with four years fixed was
appropriate. (Tr., p.135, L.24 - p.143, L.11.)
The district court took into account that Hanner had six prior felony
convictions, nine prior misdemeanors, seven prior juvenile offenses, and had
violated his probation five times. (Tr., p.135, L.24 - p.136, L.2.) The court also
noted that Hanner had a "prior conviction as a minor for failure to stop after an
accident, that in the past [Hanner] provided false information to police officers
and that [Hanner's] record shows that [he has] difficulty with honesty because
there's nine burglaries or thefts in [his] record." (Tr., p.136, Ls.11-18.) According
to Hanner's trial counsel, Hanner had a "pretty long record," and "had been to
prison several times," prior to his release on parole four years earlier. 5

(Tr.,

p.123, Ls.17-19; p.126, Ls.7-9.)
The district court next explained that the Toohill factors that leapt out in
this case were the paramount need to protect society and punishment (or
retribution) which the court described as simply "another form of accountability."
(Tr., p.137, Ls.19-25.) The court viewed "deterrence" as an important sentencing
factor generally, but explained that because Hanner had spent so much time in
prison, more prison time might not deter him from committing more crimes. (Tr.,
p.138, Ls.1-6.)

5

In regard to "public" (i.e., general) deterrence, the court stated

The presentence report has not been made a part of the appellate record.
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that although it was not a major concern, too light of a sentence would send the
wrong message to the community.

(Tr., p.138, Ls.3-8.)

Finally, the court

observed that although rehabilitation is always possible, given the "access to
many different programs and opportunities" Hanner had been given which did not
seem to make a difference in his life, it would not focus too heavily on that factor.
(Tr., p.138, Ls.9-14.)
The district court then engaged in a point-by-point review of the criteria set
out in I.C. § 19-2521 for determining whether prison (vis-a-vis probation) is
appropriate (Tr., p.138, L.15 - p.141, L.11), and concluded that the factors
weighed against granting probation:
Again, it's very easy for me to find almost every factor
favoring criminal incarceration in this case and it's very hard for me
to find any of the factors that would justify probation.
So as I look at the aggravating and mitigating factors in this
case, we have very serious injuries, multiple offenders [sic],
extremely reckless conduct that you should have known had a high
risk of harming somebody and you couple that with some alcohol
[sic].
(Tr., p.141, Ls.12-20.)
After considering all the information before it, the court sentenced Hanner
to a unified five-year prison term, with four years fixed, and explained its own
reasoning:
As I thought about this case, I very seriously thought about
recommending or sentencing you just to five years straight,
because certainly I think the conduct would justify it. The reason
I'm giving you a minimum of four and not just having you do the
whole five is because I think giving you four years will give you
some incentive to behave yourself and perform well so that you can
earn that year to get let out early. . ..
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My other concern is that when you are released from prison,
if I were to give you the straight five you'd be released without any
supervision of any kind and I think it's in your best interest and
society's best interest when you are released from prison that you
have some supervision, as least for a year period of time and so
that's going to be the order of the Court.

I am going to recommend that you be evaluated when you're
in the RDU. If they think that you would benefit from placement in
the therapeutic community, I have no objection to that. There's
been a recommendation that you participate in the work center. If
you qualify for that, again, I have no objection to that.
(Tr., p.143, L.12

p.144, L.14.)

In imposing its sentence of five years with four years fixed, the district
court reviewed the statutory penalty, the serious nature of Hanner's crime, his
extensive criminal record

including two previous stints in prison, the four

sentencing factors of Toohill, and each of the statutory factors for determining
whether imprisonment is appropriate. The court reasonably concluded that, in
light of all the factors, although five years imprisonment would have been
appropriate, allowing Hanner the chance to earn parole after four years would
best serve the interests of society and Hanner. When the entirety of the record is
considered, Hanner has failed to show the sentence excessive under any
reasonable view of the facts.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Hanner's conviction
and sentence.
DATED this 7th day of December, 2011.
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